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A complete map of who sells what to whom inside a category. Pricing bands, ICP segmentation per competitor, positioning axes, sales motion patterns, where the field is crowded, where it's open. Plus a strategic synthesis that translates what's out there today into where you can credibly win.
Public market studies describe a category from outside. Mystery Demo describes it from inside, by attending the actual sales cycles of every serious player. You get primary source on what's being sold and bought, not analyst commentary.
We start from the buyer side. Who shows up on a buyer's shortlist when they search the category. Who they invite to demo. Who closes the deal. We then layer on adjacent and emerging players that don't yet make the shortlist but might. Usually six to ten end up in scope.
That's the highest-leverage use. We run the demos as a credible buyer in the new category, not as your existing brand. The competitor reps treat us like any other buyer, which means the pricing and pitches we capture are exactly what your launch would face.
ICP segmentation across competitors usually leaves uncovered seams. A buyer profile that nobody is targeting well. A use case that gets paid lip service in a homepage but never appears in a demo flow. The matrix surfaces those seams in a way no public report does.
Common outcome. Roughly one in five projects ends up disconfirming the launch thesis. Which is exactly what the research is for. Killing a bad launch before you spend a year building for it is worth the project on its own.
Eight to twelve weeks for a six-to-ten competitor cohort. Booking the demos takes two weeks. Running the cycles in parallel takes four to six. Final synthesis takes two. Tight cohorts can compress to six weeks.
Both. Same approach. We adjust the fabula to a buyer profile in the target geography, run the cycle with regional competitors, and capture how pricing, positioning, and sales motion differ from the home market. Geographic expansions usually find more surprises than net-new category entries.
Yes. Buy candidates get evaluated as competitors first. We run their full sales cycle, capture their positioning, customer base, and pricing, and the same data feeds the M&A conversation. Acquirers tend to learn more about a target from one well-run mystery demo than from three weeks of investor decks.
Earlier than feels comfortable. Most partners run it after the strategy team has formed a thesis but before the build commitment. The research either reinforces the thesis with primary source or kills it before the burn rate climbs. Either outcome is worth far more than the cost.
A complete map of who sells what to whom inside a category. Pricing bands, ICP segmentation per competitor, positioning axes, sales motion patterns, where the field is crowded, where it's open. Plus a strategic synthesis that translates what's out there today into where you can credibly win.
Public market studies describe a category from outside. Mystery Demo describes it from inside, by attending the actual sales cycles of every serious player. You get primary source on what's being sold and bought, not analyst commentary.
We start from the buyer side. Who shows up on a buyer's shortlist when they search the category. Who they invite to demo. Who closes the deal. We then layer on adjacent and emerging players that don't yet make the shortlist but might. Usually six to ten end up in scope.
That's the highest-leverage use. We run the demos as a credible buyer in the new category, not as your existing brand. The competitor reps treat us like any other buyer, which means the pricing and pitches we capture are exactly what your launch would face.
ICP segmentation across competitors usually leaves uncovered seams. A buyer profile that nobody is targeting well. A use case that gets paid lip service in a homepage but never appears in a demo flow. The matrix surfaces those seams in a way no public report does.
Common outcome. Roughly one in five projects ends up disconfirming the launch thesis. Which is exactly what the research is for. Killing a bad launch before you spend a year building for it is worth the project on its own.
Eight to twelve weeks for a six-to-ten competitor cohort. Booking the demos takes two weeks. Running the cycles in parallel takes four to six. Final synthesis takes two. Tight cohorts can compress to six weeks.
Both. Same approach. We adjust the fabula to a buyer profile in the target geography, run the cycle with regional competitors, and capture how pricing, positioning, and sales motion differ from the home market. Geographic expansions usually find more surprises than net-new category entries.
Yes. Buy candidates get evaluated as competitors first. We run their full sales cycle, capture their positioning, customer base, and pricing, and the same data feeds the M&A conversation. Acquirers tend to learn more about a target from one well-run mystery demo than from three weeks of investor decks.
Earlier than feels comfortable. Most partners run it after the strategy team has formed a thesis but before the build commitment. The research either reinforces the thesis with primary source or kills it before the burn rate climbs. Either outcome is worth far more than the cost.
A complete map of who sells what to whom inside a category. Pricing bands, ICP segmentation per competitor, positioning axes, sales motion patterns, where the field is crowded, where it's open. Plus a strategic synthesis that translates what's out there today into where you can credibly win.
Public market studies describe a category from outside. Mystery Demo describes it from inside, by attending the actual sales cycles of every serious player. You get primary source on what's being sold and bought, not analyst commentary.
We start from the buyer side. Who shows up on a buyer's shortlist when they search the category. Who they invite to demo. Who closes the deal. We then layer on adjacent and emerging players that don't yet make the shortlist but might. Usually six to ten end up in scope.
That's the highest-leverage use. We run the demos as a credible buyer in the new category, not as your existing brand. The competitor reps treat us like any other buyer, which means the pricing and pitches we capture are exactly what your launch would face.
ICP segmentation across competitors usually leaves uncovered seams. A buyer profile that nobody is targeting well. A use case that gets paid lip service in a homepage but never appears in a demo flow. The matrix surfaces those seams in a way no public report does.
Common outcome. Roughly one in five projects ends up disconfirming the launch thesis. Which is exactly what the research is for. Killing a bad launch before you spend a year building for it is worth the project on its own.
Eight to twelve weeks for a six-to-ten competitor cohort. Booking the demos takes two weeks. Running the cycles in parallel takes four to six. Final synthesis takes two. Tight cohorts can compress to six weeks.
Both. Same approach. We adjust the fabula to a buyer profile in the target geography, run the cycle with regional competitors, and capture how pricing, positioning, and sales motion differ from the home market. Geographic expansions usually find more surprises than net-new category entries.
Yes. Buy candidates get evaluated as competitors first. We run their full sales cycle, capture their positioning, customer base, and pricing, and the same data feeds the M&A conversation. Acquirers tend to learn more about a target from one well-run mystery demo than from three weeks of investor decks.
Earlier than feels comfortable. Most partners run it after the strategy team has formed a thesis but before the build commitment. The research either reinforces the thesis with primary source or kills it before the burn rate climbs. Either outcome is worth far more than the cost.
A complete map of who sells what to whom inside a category. Pricing bands, ICP segmentation per competitor, positioning axes, sales motion patterns, where the field is crowded, where it's open. Plus a strategic synthesis that translates what's out there today into where you can credibly win.
Public market studies describe a category from outside. Mystery Demo describes it from inside, by attending the actual sales cycles of every serious player. You get primary source on what's being sold and bought, not analyst commentary.
We start from the buyer side. Who shows up on a buyer's shortlist when they search the category. Who they invite to demo. Who closes the deal. We then layer on adjacent and emerging players that don't yet make the shortlist but might. Usually six to ten end up in scope.
That's the highest-leverage use. We run the demos as a credible buyer in the new category, not as your existing brand. The competitor reps treat us like any other buyer, which means the pricing and pitches we capture are exactly what your launch would face.
ICP segmentation across competitors usually leaves uncovered seams. A buyer profile that nobody is targeting well. A use case that gets paid lip service in a homepage but never appears in a demo flow. The matrix surfaces those seams in a way no public report does.
Common outcome. Roughly one in five projects ends up disconfirming the launch thesis. Which is exactly what the research is for. Killing a bad launch before you spend a year building for it is worth the project on its own.
Eight to twelve weeks for a six-to-ten competitor cohort. Booking the demos takes two weeks. Running the cycles in parallel takes four to six. Final synthesis takes two. Tight cohorts can compress to six weeks.
Both. Same approach. We adjust the fabula to a buyer profile in the target geography, run the cycle with regional competitors, and capture how pricing, positioning, and sales motion differ from the home market. Geographic expansions usually find more surprises than net-new category entries.
Yes. Buy candidates get evaluated as competitors first. We run their full sales cycle, capture their positioning, customer base, and pricing, and the same data feeds the M&A conversation. Acquirers tend to learn more about a target from one well-run mystery demo than from three weeks of investor decks.
Earlier than feels comfortable. Most partners run it after the strategy team has formed a thesis but before the build commitment. The research either reinforces the thesis with primary source or kills it before the burn rate climbs. Either outcome is worth far more than the cost.